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Law, finance, economic growth and welfare: why does legal origin matter?  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 This paper proposes and empirically validates four theories of why legal origin influences 
growth and welfare through finance. It is a natural extension of “Law and finance: why does 
legal origin matter?” by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (2003). We find 
only partial support for the Mundell(1972), La Porta et al. (1998) and Beck et al.(2003) 
hypotheses that English common-law countries tend to have better developed financial 
intermediaries than French civil-law countries. While countries with English legal tradition have 
legal systems that improve financial depth, activity and size, countries with French legal origin 
overwhelmingly dominate in financial intermediary allocation efficiency. Countries with 
Portuguese legal origin fall in-between.  
 
JEL Classification: G2;K2;K4;O1;P5 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between legal origin and the finance-growth nexus has been explored in 
the literature through various strands of research. Currently one might club them into five 
categories.  
With respect to the first strand of research, a growing body of work suggests that cross-
country differences in legal origins explain cross-country disparities in financial development 
and growth. La Porta et al. (hence LLSV, 1998) and a great many authors have generalized the 
consensus that common-law countries have better prospects for financial development than 
French-civil-law countries. They postulate that countries with English common-law origin 
(French civil-law origin) provide the strongest (weakest) legal protection to shareholders and 
creditors (LLSV, 1998, 2000). This generalization on the superiority of the English legal origin 
has been extended to other aspects: more informative accounting standards (LLSV, 1998), better 
institutions with less corrupt governments (LLSV, 1999) and more efficient courts (Djankov et 
al., 2003).  Thus this strand has been largely dedicated to the issue of “if legal origins matter in 
financial development”. And if they matter, why do they? 
In the second strand of literature, Beck et al. (2003) shed some light on why legal origins 
matter in finance by assessing empirically two theories based on channels. The political channel 
stresses that legal traditions differ in the priority they attribute to the rights of individual 
investors vis-à-vis the state; which obviously has effects on financial development. The 
adaptability channel postulates that legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust and adapt to 
changing commercial circumstances-implying countries with legal systems that provide for 
adjustments in the capacity to meet-up with changes have a higher propensity to financial 
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development. Thus this theory solves the “why” puzzle in asserting that legal origin matter for 
finance because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic 
conditions.  
 The third strand of literature champions the nexus that financial development would 
significantly contribute to a country’s overall economic growth (McKinnon, 1973). This positive 
finance-led-growth nexus has been empirically supported at the country level (King and Levine, 
1993, Levine and Zervos, 1998), as well as at industry and firm levels (Jayaratne & Strahan, 
1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). 
 The fourth strand of literature add growth to the first strand in providing evidence for the 
link among law, finance and economic growth at firm, industry and country levels(Demirguc-
Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Beck & Levine, 2002). 
 The fifth strand, based on Mundell’s conjecture (1972) establishes that Anglophone 
countries in Africa, shaped by British activism and openness (to experiment) would naturally 
witness a higher level of financial development than their Francophone neighbors: influenced by 
French reliance on monetary rules and automaticity. To cite him in verbatim: “The French and 
English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition has 
stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with 
convertibility; stability has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and 
monetary experience. The British countries by opting for monetary independence have sacrificed 
stability, but gained monetary experience and better developed monetary institutions.”(Mundell, 
1972; pp.42-43). On a brief historical note, the partition of sub-Saharan Africa into British and 
French spheres in the 19th century and their implementation of antagonistic colonial policies1 
                         
1
 The British and French adopted different colonial policies. While the French imposed a highly centralized 
bureaucratic system that clearly underlined empire-building, the British on the other hand administered 
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have prompted many researchers in the past decades to investigate how colonial origin  have 
influenced the finance-growth nexus through legal traditions(Mundell, 1972; Assane & 
Malamud_______; Agbor 2011). 
 The present paper encompasses all five strands mentioned afore by investigating the law-
finance-growth phenomenon with financial intermediary (depth, efficiency, size, activity) and 
growth (welfare and GDP) dynamics within a colonial-legacy framework. (1) First and foremost, 
it completes the first and second strands  by looking at if British-common-law legal traditions 
provide better prospects for finance at all quantifiable dynamics of financial intermediation; this 
would either confirm or reject the generalization that countries with English common-law origin 
(French-civil-law origin) provide the strongest (weakest) environment for financial 
development.(2) Secondly, inspired by the motivation of the second and fourth strands we shall 
contribute to existing literature by providing evidence of “why” legal traditions affect economic 
growth and welfare through financial development. In like manner as the second strand solved 
the puzzle of why legal origins matter in finance, we shall postulate and empirically verify 
channels via which growth is affected by legal origins through finance. (3)With regard to third 
strand, our empirical analysis should provide evidence as to whether a positive finance-growth 
nexus holds with respect to legal origins in the context of financial intermediary dynamics. (4) 
The colonial legacy context of our paper helps assess the validity of Mundell’s conjecture in the 
fifth strand.  (5) Last but not the least, the distinction of growth aspects (like welfare and GDP 
growth) in our analysis shed more light and provide additional emphasis for nexus 
                                                                               
decentralized, flexible and pragmatic policies. Economic motives dominated British colonial activities who sought 
to transform their colonies into commercially viable trading societies through the indirect-rule: producing raw 
material and consuming British manufactures. The French on their part  propagated their imperial motive through 
the policy of assimilation.  
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generalization. Thus we shall substantially contribute to existing literature by assessing the 
following testable hypotheses: 
H1: Legal origins explain growth and welfare through our proposed financial channels (See 
Section 2). 
H2: The Mundell(1972), La Porta et al.(1998)2 and Beck et al.(2003)3 hypotheses do not apply to 
every dynamic of financial intermediation. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses various financial 
channels to growth and welfare. Data sources and methodology are described and outlined 
respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis and discussion of results are reported in Section 4.  
We conclude with Section 5.   
 
2. Law, legal-origin, finance and growth theory 
 
 We propose the following law-finance and growth theories based on four financial 
intermediary channels. 
 
2.1 The financial depth channel 
 
  The financial depth channel is based on two premises: money supply and liquid 
liabilities. We postulate that the quantity of Money in the economy (M2) as well as the amount 
held by deposit money banks and other financial institutions (financial system deposits) depend 
on legal tradition.  In other words money supply and liquid liabilities depend on legal-origins. If 
the depth of finance either in the overall economy (M2) or in banks (liquid liabilities) is 
                         
2
 The result show that common-law countries generally have the strongest legal protection of corporate shareholders 
and creditors, while French civil law countries are the weakest in legal protection of investors(La Porta et al., 1998; 
page 1). 
3
 “Third German civil law and British common-law countries have significantly better-developed financial 
intermediaries and markets and better property right protection than French civil-law countries, which is fully 
consistent with the adaptability channel”(Beck et al.,2003; page 673).  
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determined by legal tradition, then it should be higher in countries with common-law origin 
because they provide environments more favorable to openness (trade and capital) and 
competition. Historically the ruling classes opposed financial development because it gave their 
competitors an edge and reduced their potential margins. British common-law systems based on 
private property rights therefore favored competition and openness. To buttress this point further 
from a colonial perspective, the British and French adopted different colonial policies. While the 
French imposed a highly centralized bureaucratic system that clearly underlined empire-building, 
the British on the other hand administered decentralized, flexible and pragmatic policies. 
Economic motives dominated British colonial activities who sought to transform their colonies 
into commercially viable trading societies through the indirect-rule: production of raw material 
and consumption of British manufactures. The French on their part propagated their imperial 
motive through the policy of assimilation. Therefore British colonial policies based on common-
law provide for legal systems that favor financial depth; both at overall economic and bank 
levels.  This has been empirically verified by Rajan and Zingales (2003) who used data from 
1913 to 1999. Countries with higher levels of financial depth and activity should therefore be 
expected to growth faster.  
 
2.2 The financial efficiency channel 
 
  We propose financial intermediary allocation efficiency channels based on two factors: 
bank system efficiency and financial system efficiency. We postulate that countries with French 
civil-law origin should have legal systems that provide for greater levels of allocation efficiency 
because their banks lend-out a greater chunk of mobilized funds (deposits). French tradition has 
always stressed the passive nature of monetary policy, the importance of exchange stability with 
convertibility, and the need for explicit deposit insurance. On the other hand English common-
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law systems with no explicit insurance deposits and monetary independence have sacrificed 
stability for monetary experience and better developed monetary institutions. Therefore a greater 
proportion of deposits mobilized by bank are retained in common-law countries to avoid bank-
run. A substantial deterrent to bank-run is exchange rate stability which is championed by French 
civil-law countries. Thus empirically, French civil-law countries with high levels of allocation 
efficiency should improve faster in growth and welfare.  
 
2.3 The financial size channel 
 
 The relative importance of openness and competition should favor a broader financial 
system in common-law countries than in their civil-law counterparts (French and Portuguese). If 
a positive finance-growth nexus applies, then we can infer that common-law traditions should 
give birth to legal systems that induce higher growth and welfare gains through their inherent 
positive effect of broadening financial systems.  
 
2.4 The financial activity channel  
 
The financial activity channel is based on two premises: ‘private credit by domestic 
banks’ for banking-system-activity and ‘private domestic credit from banks and other financial 
institutions’ for financial-system-activity. The notions of financial activity and financial depth, 
though different in conception have the same theoretical basis as in Section 2.1. Thus, activity 
and depth are two interrelated financial channels that influence growth and welfare; with the 
greater effect on common-law origin countries followed by Portuguese (French based) civil-law 
countries and lastly by countries with French civil-law legal tradition.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
 Our data is from 26 sub-Saharan African countries with French-civil; Portuguese-civil 
and British-common law origins (see Appendix 1 for details). Due to data limitations the panel 
ranges from 1986 to 2009 for each cross-section. We include origin of countries in our data to 
take account of endogeneity. Borrowing from Beck et al. (2003), as point-out by Berkowitz et al. 
(2002), it is important to distinguish between legal origin countries (United Kingdom, France, 
the U.S.A, Germany, Austria and Switzerland) which formed the legal tradition, from transplant 
countries which received the legal traditions. However within the framework of our paper this 
isn’t much of an issue because legal origins are primarily used as instruments. We classify 
collected data into the following three categories.  
 
3.1.1 Financial channels 
 
 Indicators of financial channels are obtained after computations from the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD). We are unable to collect data from financial 
markets because Côte d’Ivoire is the sole country with a French civil-legal origin in the database 
with information on stock markets. The regional nature of this financial market in Côte d’Ivoire 
makes it even harder to disentangle individual contributions of the eight West African countries 
that make it up (seven French legal origin countries and one Portuguese legal origin country). In 
sharp contrast we found many English legal origin countries with information on stock markets 
(Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe...etc).  This disparity poses a practical difficulty of coming-up with harmonious 
comparison criteria for stock market data. We are thus poised to restrict our analysis to a 
financial intermediary framework.  
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a) Financial depth channel 
 
 With respect to our hypotheses, we proxy financial depth both from overall-economic 
and financial-system perspectives, through indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and 
financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. These two variables should robustly check each 
other in the course of our analysis since more than 96% of ‘financial system deposits’ 
information is contained in broad money supply (see Appendix 3).   
 
b) Financial allocation efficiency channel 
 
 We refer here to neither the profitability-oriented concept of financial efficiency nor the 
production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data 
Envelopment Analysis). What we seek to bring to light is the ability of banks to effectively 
address their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits to credits. We put forward two 
proxies for banking system efficiency and financial system efficiency (respectively “bank credit 
on bank deposits” and “financial system credit on financial system deposits). Preliminary 
correlation analysis(see Appendix 3) certify the later can check the former and vice-versa, as the 
former contains over 96% of variability in the  later.  
 
c) Financial size channel 
 
 Consistent with the FDSD we measure financial intermediary activity as the ratio of 
“deposit bank assets” to the sum of “deposit bank assets and central bank assets”. Unfortunately, 
unlike proxies for other channels we do not find another proxy that overlap significantly with 
this variable despite numerous computations.   
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d) Financial activity channel 
 
 This is the ability of banks to grant credit to economic operators. We check bank-sector- 
activity with financial-sector-activity, proxied by “private domestic credit” and “private credit by 
domestic banks and other financial institutions” respectively. Correlation analysis reveal each 
contain more than 98% of information in the other (see Appendix 3).  
  
3.1.2 Growth and Welfare 
 
 GDP growth and GDP per capita growth rates are used as indicators of growth and 
welfare respectively. This is in line with the finance-growth literature (Levine & King, 1993; 
Hassan et al., 2011). African Development Indicators (ADI) from the World Bank is the source 
of this data.   
 
3.1.3 Control variables 
 
 Borrowing from (Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 2011) we shall control for 
inflation, trade, population growth and general government final consumption expenditure in the 
finance-growth regressions. These control variables are also obtained from ADI.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
 Borrowing from Beck at al. (2003) and more recently Agbor (2011) we use Two-Stage-
Least-Squares (TSLS) with dummies of legal origins as instrumental variables. Beyond the 
numerous advantages of using TSLS (to other conventional regression methods) the object of our 
paper which is to assess how legal origins affect growth through proposed financial channels 
require an Instrumental Variable (hence IV) estimation method.  Therefore in the course of the 
IV analysis we shall demonstrate the following: 
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-justify the use of a TSLS over an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method through the 
Hausman test for endogeneity; 
-show that the instruments (legal origins) explain the endogenous components of explanatory 
variables (financial channels), conditional on other covariates; 
-assess that the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error term of the explanatory 
equation through an Over-Identifying Restriction (OIR) test.  
 Our methodology includes the following models.  
First stage regression:  
 
++= itit BritishhannelFinancialC )(10 γγ +itFrench)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ υα ++ itiX
    (1) 
 
Second stage regression: 
 
++= itit hannelFinancialCGrowth )(10 γγ +itiXβ µ
                                                        (2) 
  
In both equations, X is a set of exogenous variables that are included in some of the 
second stage regressions. For the first and second stage equations,  v  and u, respectively denote 
the error terms. Instrumental variables are the three legal origin dummies.  
 
4. Cross-country regressions 
This section presents results from panel regressions to assess the importance of legal 
origin in explaining cross-country variance in economic growth and welfare. That is, the 
propensity of legal origins to explain cross-country differences in financial-channel indicators 
and the ability of the exogenous components of financial channels to account for cross-country 
disparities in growth and welfare. 
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4.1 Legal origins, growth and welfare 
 
 Consistent with Beck et al. (2003), in Table 1 we regress our growth and welfare 
indicators on British, French and Portuguese legal origin dummies by simple OLS and further 
test for joint significance. Our choice of only three legal origins is due to data constraints and in 
line with recent literature (Agbor, 2011). The Fisher-test results for legal origin dummies in 
Table 1 confirms the consensus that distinguishing countries by legal origin helps elucidate 
cross-country differences in growth and welfare. The Scandinavian legal origin is captured by 
the constant. Even after controlling for government expenditure and population growth, there’s 
overwhelming evidence that countries with English common-law legal origins grow faster in 
terms of GDP and Welfare than those with French civil-law traditions. Countries with 
Portuguese legal-origin (which is inspired by French civil-law) are between the English and the 
French. These initial findings are consistent with empirical literature on sub-Saharan Africa 
(Mundell, 1972; Agbor, 2011)4. As in Beck et al. (2003) we also note that based on the results, 
our instruments are significantly different from each other.  
 
Table 1: Legal origins and growth  
  Base Model(Growth:GDPg) Robustness(Welfare:GDPpcg) 
 
 
Legal origin 
(dummies) 
English 4.291*** 5.915*** 1.825*** 5.149*** 
 (15.46) (9.024) (6.690) (5.462) 
French 2.803*** 4.009*** 0.041 3.30*** 
 (10.61) (7.544) (0.158) (3.630) 
Portuguese 4.619*** 5.859*** 2.375*** 5.155*** 
 (8.73) (8.312) (4.572) (5.642) 
 
Control 
variables 
Gov. Expenditure --- -0.095*** --- -0.085** 
  (-2.714)  (-2.403) 
Population  Growth --- --- --- -0.773*** 
    (-3.432) 
F-test for legal origin (dummies)  9.479*** 8.704*** 14.832*** 10.795*** 
Adjusted. R² 0.026 0.038 0.042 0.062 
Number of observations 621 585 621 585 
GDP growth rate. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. *,**,***; significance at 10%,5%  and 1% respectively.  
                         
4
 Agbor (2011) uses trade and education indictors to verify how colonial origin matters in explaining cross-country 
difference in economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa. His results show that English speaking countries 
perform better than their French speaking counter-parts, while countries with Portuguese legal origin fall between 
the two.  
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4.2 Legal origins and financial channels  
 
 Table 2 below investigates by simple OLS whether legal origin explains cross-country 
difference in financial intermediary development. We regress proxies for various financial 
channels on legal origins when other covariates apply (panel B) as well as when they don’t 
(panel A). The regression of financial channels on instruments is an essential condition in the 
TSLS approach. (see equation 1). These first stage regressions provide the basis for assuming 
instruments are strong and worthwhile5. In both panels and for all endogenous regressors 
(financial channels) we find evidence that the instruments are significant determinants of   
finance. We report the Fisher (F) statistics which test whether legal origin dummy variables 
taken together, significantly explain cross-country variations in financial channel indicators. 
Consistent with our finance and growth theory (see Section 2), Table 2 indicates that British 
common-law countries have significantly greater levels of financial depth and activity. French 
civil-law countries also have significantly higher levels of allocation efficiency, while countries 
with British legal tradition dominate in financial intermediary size. In line with Agbor (2011) the 
strength of countries with Portuguese legal origin falls between the French and the English.  
Results in Table 2 are broadly consistent with hypotheses on our law-finance-growth theory 
outlined in Section 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
5
 The instruments must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, conditional on the other covariates 
in the first-stage regression.  
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Table 2: Legal origins, financial depth, efficiency, activity and size 
 Panel A: First Stage Regressions Without control variables 
  Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size 
  Base M. Robust M. Base M. Robust M. Base M. Robust M. Base M. 
  M2 Fdgdp Bcbd Fcfd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
 
 
Legal 
origin 
(dummies) 
English 0.345*** 0.290*** 0.545*** 0.563*** 0.149*** 0.163*** 0.699*** 
 (30.69) (27.51) (26.67) (28.55) (20.94) (22.43) (49.77) 
French 0.203*** 0.130*** 1.018*** 1.010*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.695*** 
 (19.05) (12.94) (52.30) (53.58) (19.04) (18.69) (52.57) 
Portuguese 0.356*** 0.251*** 0.716*** 0.701*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.631*** 
 (16.05) (11.66) (17.88) (17.37) (10.13) (9.934) (23.20) 
F-test(legal origin) 48.01*** 61.90*** 141.8*** 136.43*** 2.141 5.49*** 2.62* 
Adjusted. R² 0.138 0.172 0.313 0.316 0.003 0.015 0.005 
Num. of observations 588 586 617 586 586 586 611 
       
 
 
 Panel B: First Stage Regressions With control variables(conditional on other covariates) 
 
Legal 
origin 
(dummies) 
English 0.336*** 0.274*** 0.590*** 0.653*** 0.190*** 0.196*** 0.540*** 
 (7.941) (6.968) (6.844) (7.589) (6.378) (6.456) (10.23) 
French 0.248*** 0.170*** 1.016*** 1.050*** 0.185*** 0.178*** 0.572*** 
 (6.449) (4.755) (12.95) (13.37) (6.824) (6.428) (11.95) 
Portuguese 0.441*** 0.323*** 0.768*** 0.800*** 0.230*** 0.224*** 0.579*** 
 (10.58) (8.325) (9.391) (9.424) (7.833) (7.454) (11.60) 
 
 
 
Control 
variables 
Trade 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 
 (5.866) (6.404) (-3.176) (-3.919) (3.030) (2.757) (6.856) 
Inflation -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.003*** 
 (-3.503) (-3.472) (-3.519) (-2.895) (-3.345) (-3.596) (-6.653) 
Gov. 0.003** 0.002** 0.004 0.003 -0.0003 0.0002 0.002 
 (2.353) (2.427) (1.624) (1.353) (-0.344) (0.288) (1.246) 
Pop.  -0.055*** -0.053*** 0.020 0.016 -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.005 
 (-6.141) (-6.436) (1.109) (0.884) (-4.228) (-4.034) (-0.462) 
F-test(legal origin) 63.41*** 72.85*** 55.38*** 54.81*** 15.30*** 15.89*** 24.80*** 
Adjusted. R² 0.414 0.448 0.371 0.378 0.139 0.144 0.207 
Num. of observations 530 532 552 532 532 532 546 
M2: Broad money supply.  Fdgdp: Financial deposit on GDP. Bcbd: Bank credit on bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial credit on financial deposits. 
Dbacba: deposit bank assets/(deposit bank assets + central bank assets). Pcrb: Private domestic credit on GDP. Prcbof: Private credit from 
domestic banks and other financial institutions on GDP. English: English legal origin dummy. French: French legal origin dummy. Portuguese: 
Portuguese legal origin dummy. GDPg: GDP growth rate. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. Gov: Government final expenditure. Pop: 
Population growth rate. *,**,***; significance at 10%,5%  and 1% respectively. M: Model. Num: Number.  
 
 
 
 
4.3 Examination of financial channels using a simple instrumental variable procedure 
 
 Tables 3 and 4 below address the issues of whether the exogenous component of 
financial channels explain growth and welfare on the one hand; and on the other hand whether 
legal origin explains growth and welfare through some other mechanisms besides proposed  
financial channels. To make this assessment we use TSLS with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. The first and second stage regressions are 
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based respectively on equations (1) and (2) of Sections 3.2. Rejection of the null hypothesis of 
the Hausman-test in 27 of the 28 regressions in Tables 3 and 4 indicate the presence of 
endogeneity and justify of our use of TSLS as estimation methodology. While coefficients of 
financial channels address the first issue after controlling for potential endogeneity, the second 
issues is looked-at by the OIR test.  The null hypothesis of the Sargan-OIR test suggests that the 
instrumental variables do not suffer from the same problem of endogeneity as the exogenous 
components of the endogenous regressors (financial channels) and therefore are (legal dummies) 
not correlated with the error terms of the equation of interest (second stage regression). Thus a 
rejection of the OIR test implies that legal origins explain growth (and welfare) through some 
other mechanisms other than financial channels. In controlling for other potential exogenous 
determinants of growth (and welfare) we do not include all the control variables in panel B of 
Table 2 because of the limited number of instruments6. Robustness of our models is ensured by 
alternative indicators of financial channels.  Results in Table 3 provide full support for the fact 
that the exogenous components of financial depth and efficiency explain growth and welfare. 
However (but for the effect of financial depth on welfare) given the rejection of the OIR test for 
almost all the regressions,  legal origin dummies explain growth and welfare beyond their ability 
to explain cross-country variations in financial depth and efficiency channels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
6
 We have just three instruments (dummies of legal origin). In order to test for OIR, the number of instruments must 
be higher than the number of endogenous regressors by at least one degree of freedom. OIR test is not possible in 
either exact identification (instruments=endogenous regressors) or under-identification (instruments <endogenous 
regressors).  
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Table 3: The depth and efficiency channels 
 Panel A: Second-Stage regressions with  Financial Depth channel 
Variables and tests Growth(GDPg)  regressions Welfare(GDPpcg) regressions 
 Mod.1 Mod.1* Mod.2 Mod.2* Mod.3 Mod.3* Mod.4 Mod.4* 
M2 12.92*** --- 11.55** --- 4.33*** --- 10.75*** --- 
 (8.76)  (2.130)  (5.32)  (3.170)  
Fdgdp --- 16.36*** --- 7.398 --- 5.681*** --- 10.44*** 
  (16.57)  (1.318)  (5.453)  (3.134) 
Gov. --- --- 0.029 0.143* --- --- --- --- 
   (0.288) (1.752)     
Pop. --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.72** -0.42 
       (-2.103) (-1.620) 
Hausman  test 139.9*** 147.76*** 80.40*** 74.36*** 9.69*** 8.76*** 25.29*** 16.58*** 
OIR(Sargan) test 0.860 7.15** 0.809 3.658* 11.66*** 8.25** 0.356 2.05 
 [0.650] [0.027] [0.368] [0.055] [0.002] [0.016] [0.550] [0.151] 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 1154*** 353.48*** --- --- 1154*** 584*** --- --- 
         
 Panel B: Second-Stage regressions with Financial  Efficiency channel 
 Growth(GDPg)  regressions Welfare(GDPpcg) regressions 
 Mod.1 Mod.1* Mod.2 Mod.2* Mod.3 Mod.3* Mod.4 Mod.4* 
Bcbd 4.02*** --- -0.74  0.93** --- -4.77** --- 
 (9.065)  (-0.852)  (2.555)  (-2.126)  
Fcfd --- 4.09*** --- -0.69 --- 0.95** --- -5.44** 
  (8.725)  (-0.721)  (2.521)  (-2.204) 
Gov. --- --- 0.28*** 0.28*** --- --- --- --- 
   (5.370) (5.120)     
Pop. --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.85** 2.04** 
       (2.372) (2.387) 
Hausman  test 102.3*** 79.84*** 102.4*** 89.02*** 31.68*** 24.20*** 34.21*** 43.93*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 62.50*** 57.93*** 7.07*** 5.93** 38.39*** 34.55*** 10.66*** 5.87** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.014] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.015] 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 1311*** 1394*** --- --- 1311*** 1394*** --- --- 
M2: Broad money supply.  Fdgdp: Financial deposit on GDP. Bcbd: Bank credit on bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial credit on financial deposits. English: 
English legal origin dummy. French: French legal origin dummy. Portuguese: Portuguese legal origin dummy. GDPg: GDP growth rate. GDPpcg: 
GDP per capita growth rate. Gov: Government final expenditure. Pop: Population growth rate. *,**,***; significance at 10%,5%  and 1% respectively. 
(): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values. Weak I. Test (F-stats): F-statistics for Weak Instrument 
test at first stage regression. OIR: overidentifying restrictions. 
 
Table 4 below looks at the concern of whether the exogenous components of financial 
size and activity channels explain growth and whether legal origin explains growth beyond the 
financial size and activity channels. We employ the same TSLS methodology as above.  Firstly, 
results suggest exogenous components of financial activity and size explain growth and welfare. 
Given the overwhelming rejection of the OIR test, we conclude that instruments explain growth 
and welfare beyond their ability to explain cross-country changes in financial intermediary 
activity and size.  
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Table 4: The activity and size channels 
 Panel A: Second-Stage regressions with Financial Activity channel 
Variables and tests Growth(GDPg)  regressions Welfare(GDPpcg) regressions 
 Mod.1 Mod.1* Mod.2 Mod.2* Mod.3 Mod.3* Mod.4 Mod.4* 
Pcrb. 26.26*** --- 8.06 --- 7.81*** --- 50.78 --- 
 (7.818)  (0.349)  (4.266)  (1.068)  
Pcrbof. --- 25.21*** --- 40.44 --- 7.64*** --- 37.66 
  (7.737)  (0.390)  (4.401)  (1.283) 
Gov. --- --- 0.176 -0.14 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.798) (-0.13)     
Pop. --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.27 -1.66 
       (-0.999) (-1.148) 
Hausman  test 179.3*** 178*** 73.41*** 75.63*** 13.09*** 14.32*** 36.58*** 34.84*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 5.073* 3.82 6.97*** 3.32* 20.33*** 18.82*** 0.21 1.20 
 [0.079] [0.147] [0.008] [0.068] [0.000] [0.000] [0.641] [0.273] 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 394*** 407*** --- --- 394*** 407*** --- --- 
         
 Panel B: Second-Stage regressions with Financial Size channel 
 Growth(GDPg)  regressions Welfare(GDPpcg) regressions 
 Mod.1  Mod.2  Mod.3  Mod.4  
Dbacba 5.21***  -2.39  1.49***  18.17  
 (13.64)  (-0.684)  (3.77)  (1.184)  
         
Gov. ---  0.35**  ---    
   (2.15)      
Pop. ---    ---  -4.39  
       (-1.133)  
Hausman test 19.53***  36.36***  0.49  22.50***  
OIR(Sargan)  test 19.41***  6.78  28.88***  1.352  
 [0.000]  [0.009]  [0.000]  [0.244]  
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 2567***    2567***    
Dbacba: deposit bank assets/(deposit bank assets + central bank assets). Pcrb: Private domestic credit on GDP. Prcbof: Private credit from domestic 
banks and other financial institutions on GDP. English: English legal origin dummy. French: French legal origin dummy. Portuguese: Portuguese legal 
origin dummy. GDPg: GDP growth rate. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. Gov: Government final expenditure. Pop: Population growth rate. 
*,**,***; significance at 10%,5%  and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-
values. Weak I. Test (F-stats): F-statistics for Weak Instrument test at first stage regression. OIR: overidentifying restrictions. 
 
 
 
4.3 Examination of channels using an extended instrumental variable procedure 
 
 In accordance with Beck et al. (2003), we now explore the financial channels 
simultaneously using an extended version of the instrumental variable procedure. Due to 
constraints in instrumental variables (only three present) and issues related to multicolinearity 
and overparametization, we explore simultaneous channels only on bivariate basis. Examining 
more than two endogenous regressors simultaneously will result in exact-identification or under-
identification which renders the OIR test practically impossible.  Therefore we assess whether 
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the exogenous components of the financial channels explain growth. As in earlier regressions, 
the presence of two proxies for each channel allows for robustness checks. Rejections of the null 
hypothesis of the Hausman-test in all 24 regressions in Table 5 indicate the presence of 
endogeneity and justify of our estimation methodology (TSLS). For the most part, results also 
suggest that legal origin explains growth (and welfare) through financial channels and not 
through other mechanisms. For either growth or welfare, we robustly examine 12 regressions 
using two different financial channels. Of the 24 regressions, 19 do not reject the OIR test, 
implying the null hypothesis that legal origin explains growth (and welfare) only through 
financial channels is not rejected. 4 of the 5 regressions that reject the OIR test involve the 
simultaneous use of size and efficiency variables (either in growth or welfare regressions). This 
implies legal origins do not explain growth only through financial size and efficiency channels 
but also through some other mechanisms. The instruments are not only valid through the OIR 
test but also strong because 20 of the 24 Cragg-Donald statistics for weak instrument test exceed 
critical values at a 5% significance level; implying the null hypothesis for the existence of weak 
instruments is rejected for the most part. The presence of negative finance-growth nexus for 
certain channels (efficiency and size) corroborates results in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.  While 
by virtue of Table 3, the negative results for financial efficiency were significantly expected, 
those (negative coefficients) of financial activity and size (Panel B of Table 5) resulting from 
their simultaneous application with depth and activity respectively could be explained by their 
high correlations (see Appendix 3). This explanation is consistent with Beck et al. (2003). While 
effects of legal origins through financial channels are greater for GDP growth than welfare when 
financial channels are considered independently (see Tables 3 and 4), when financial channels 
are simultaneously considered, effects may weigh greater in favor of either growth or welfare 
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depending on dynamics (combination of channels). This could provide a basis for further 
research but in the mean do not reflect the object of our study.   
  
 
. 
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           Table 5: Growth, Welfare and financial channels  
Financial  Panel A: Second-Stage regressions with  Growth and financial channels 
Channels Variables Depth and Efficiency Depth and Activity Depth and Size Efficiency and Activity Efficiency and Size Activity and Size 
  Model 1 Model 1* Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 3* Model 4 Model 4* Model 5 Model 5* Model 6 Model 6* 
 
Depth 
M2 11.68*** --- 9.41** --- 10.17*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (8.048)  (2.380  (3.940)        
Fdgdp --- 12.72*** --- 6.36 --- 9.36*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (7.813)  (1.532)  (3.740)       
 
Efficiency 
Bcbd 0.47  --- --- --- --- -1.69* --- -3.00*** --- --- --- 
 (0.906)      (-1.846)  (-3.516)    
Fcfd --- 1.22*** --- --- --- --- --- -1.02 --- -3.34*** --- --- 
  (2.736)      (-1.261)  (-3.494)   
 
Activity 
Pcrb --- --- 7.11 --- --- --- 35.40*** --- --- --- 63.29** --- 
   (0.869)    (6.732)    (2.405)  
Pcrbof --- --- --- 15.75** --- --- --- 30.49*** --- --- --- 40.81*** 
    (2.477)    (6.785)    (2.795) 
Size Dbacba --- --- --- --- 1.08 2.38*** --- --- 8.65*** 9.11*** -7.72 -3.45 
     (0.988) (2.882)   (8.521) (8.004) (-1.425) (-1.099) 
Hausman  test 124.84*** 110.62*** 136.17*** 160.58*** 41.54*** 36.82*** 163.99*** 147.00*** 45.82*** 39.28*** 37.12*** 35.89*** 
OIR(Sargan) test 0.021 1.313 0.068 1.65 0.302 2.291 0.887 1.88 6.56** 4.86** 0.125 1.42 
 
[0.884] [0.251] [0.793] [0.198] [0.582] [0.130] [0.346] [0.170] [0.010] [0.027] [0.722] [0.233] 
Cragg-Donald M.E.V test 94.83 92.64 24.29 55.59 46.41 59.96 37.45 45.31 63.33 53.40 3.39 6.83 
 Observations 584 585 583 585 579 579 585 585 608 579 579 579 
 
            
  Panel B: Second-Stage regressions with  Welfare and financial channels 
  Depth and Efficiency Depth and Activity Depth and Size Efficiency and Activity Efficiency and Size Activity and Size 
  Model 1 Model 1* Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 3* Model 4 Model 4* Model 5 Model 5* Model 6 Model 6* 
 
Depth 
M2 7.98*** --- 15.74*** --- 11.86*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(6.144)  (4.345)  (4.700)        
Fdgdp --- 8.61*** --- 14.47*** --- 11.15*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
 (5.930)  (4.187)  (4.655)       
 
Efficiency 
Bcbd -1.53*** --- --- --- --- --- -2.93*** --- -3.72*** --- --- --- 
 
(-3.273)      (-3.902)  (-4.642)    
Fcfd --- -0.98** --- --- --- --- --- -2.48*** --- -4.06*** --- --- 
 
 (-2.470)      (-3.667)  (-4.553)   
 
Activity 
Pcrb --- --- -24.15*** --- --- --- 23.62*** --- --- --- 73.85*** --- 
 
  (-3.222)    (5.488)    (2.646)  
Pcrbof --- --- --- -13.85*** --- --- --- 20.51*** --- ---  48.74*** 
 
   (-2.620)    (5.445)    (3.218) 
Size Dbacba --- --- --- --- -3.38*** -1.95** --- --- 5.75*** 6.15*** -13.67*** -8.93*** 
 
    (-3.143) (-2.470)   (6.031) (5.803) (-2.377) (-2.738) 
Hausman test  33.01*** 26.83*** 18.73*** 12.85*** 25.94*** 19.08*** 50.57*** 45.24*** 7.57** 7.40** 30.38*** 28.53*** 
OIR(Sargan) test 0.893 2.68 0.001 2.08 0.043 2.06 2.22 3.33* 8.50*** 5.57** 0.026 1.12 
 
[0.344] [0.101] [0.972 ] [0.148] [0.835] [0.150] [0.135] [0.067 ] [0.003] [0.018] [0.870] [0.289 ] 
Cragg-Donald M.E.V test 94.83 92.64 24.29 55.59 46.41 59.96 37.45 45.31 63.33 53.40 3.39 6.83 
Observations 584 585 583 585 579 579 585 585 608 579 579 579 
M2: Broad money supply.  Fdgdp: Financial deposit on GDP . Bcbd: Bank credit on bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial credit on financial deposits. Dbacba: deposit bank assets/(deposit bank assets + central bank 
assets). Pcrb: Private domestic credit on GDP. Prcbof: Private credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions on GDP. English: English legal origin dummy. French: French legal origin dummy. 
Portuguese: Portuguese legal origin dummy. GDPg: GDP growth rate. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. Gov: Government final expenditure. Pop: Population growth rate. *,**,***; significance at 10%,5%  
and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values. Weak I. Test (F-stats): F-statistics for Weak Instrument test at first stage regression. OIR: 
overidentifying restrictions. The critical value of Cragg-Donald’s statistics for weak instrument test at 5% significance level with a desired maximal bias (of the Instrumental Variable estimator relative to OLS) of 
10% is 13.43.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
 While past works show that legal origin explains growth (Mundell, 1973; Agbor, 
2011), this paper examines the financial mechanisms through which legal origin explains 
growth. We propose four channels. The financial depth and activity channels postulate that 
legal origins determine money supply, liquid liabilities and ability of financial institutions to 
allocated credit to economic operators. Countries with common-law origin should experience 
higher levels of financial depth and activity because the legal tradition provides for a legal  
system that champions private property rights, a more favorable environment for openness 
(trade and capital) and competition. Countries with civil-law origin are least in financial depth 
and activity because historically their financial laws were devised to champion imperialism 
and financial stability rather than openness and monetary experience. Consistent with Agbor 
(2011), countries with Portuguese legal origin (which is based on French civil-law) have their 
financial performances (in depth and activity) lower than the former (common-law origin) but 
slightly higher than the later (French civil-law origin). Financial intermediary efficiency is 
highest in countries with Francophone decent because the French tradition has always stressed 
the passive nature of monetary policy, the importance of exchange stability with 
convertibility, and the need for explicit deposit insurance. For the fourth channel (financial 
size), the relative importance of openness and competition should favor a broader financial 
system in common-law countries than in their civil-law counterparts (French and Portuguese). 
If a positive finance-growth nexus applies, then we can infer that common-law traditions 
should induce higher growth and welfare gains through their inherent positive effect of 
broadening financial systems.  
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 Our results provide evidence that legal origins matter in explaining growth and 
welfare through financial channels because they are inherently business or risk-averse 
friendly. Legal systems that provide conditions for openness, competition and free financial 
market enterprise should benefit more in growth and welfare, while those championing the 
power of the state, monetary stability and imperialism should significantly experience lower 
growth through thinner improvements in most financial channels. On the other hand, a legal 
system that is favorable to financial stability (through monetary dependence and explicit 
deposit insurance) should gain in financial intermediary efficiency. These findings 
specifically contribute to the literature by partially rejecting the Mundell (1972), Laporta et al. 
(1998) and Beck et al. (2003) hypotheses.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Presentation of legal origin and countries 
Legal origin Countries 
English  Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
French   Burkina Faso, Cameroon, C.A.R, Chad, Congo Rep., Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
Portuguese   Guinée-Bissau, Cape Verde, Mozambique  
 
  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min. Max. C.V Skew. Kurt. W.S.D B.S.D Obser. 
Financial 
Depth 
M2 0.280 0.191 0.004 1.279 0.682 2.196 5.279 0.101 0.162 588 
Fdgdp 0.211 0.183 0.013 1.052 0.869 2.172 4.814 0.096 0.157 586 
Financial 
Efficiency 
Bcbd 0.785 0.398 0.091 2.879 0.508 1.253 2.467 0.306 0.267 617 
Fcfd 0.787 0.378 0.139 2.775 0.480 1.262 2.534 0.278 0.267 586 
Fin. Size Dbacba 0.689 0.224 0.045 1.466 0.326 -0.65 0.099 0.159 0.168 611 
Financial 
Activity  
Pcrb 0.140 0.113 0.011 0.723 0.808 2.301 7.250 0.067 0.092 586 
Pcrbof 0.145 0.116 0.011 0.723 0.795 2.114 6.087 0.068 0.094 586 
Colonial 
Origin 
Englsih 0.423 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.168 0.311 -1.90 0.000 0.503 624 
French 0.461 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.081 0.154 -1.97 0.000 0.508 624 
Portuguese 0.115 0.319 0.000 1.000 2.771 2.407 3.797 0.000 0.325 624 
Growth  GDPg 3.639 4.547 -28.1 33.62 1.249 -0.62 8.165 4.466 1.233 621 
GDPpcg 1.061 4.505 -29.6 29.06 4.243 -0.61 7.097 4.369 1.410 621 
 
Control 
Variables 
Inflation 11.35 23.03 -100 200 2.028 3.549 27.62 20.84 10.97 615 
Trade 78.50 40.71 14.55 255 0.518 1.154 1.088 26.07 31.92 585 
Gov. 14.54 5.667 2.650 38.75 0.389 1.072 1.400 4.386 3.753 585 
Pop.  2.588 0.867 -1.07 6.238 0.335 -0.47 1.734 0.723 0.508 598 
M2: Broad money supply.  Fdgdp: Financial deposit on GDP . Bcbd: Bank credit on bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial credit on financial 
deposits. Dbacba: deposit bank assets/(deposit bank assets + central bank assets). Pcrb: Private domestic credit on GDP. Prcbof: Private 
credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions on GDP. English: English legal origin dummy. French: French legal origin 
dummy. Portuguese: Portuguese legal origin dummy. GDPg: GDP growth rate. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. Gov: Government 
final expenditure. Pop: Population growth rate. Obser: Observations.  
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       Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix  
Fin. Depth Fin. Efficiency F. Size Financial Activity Legal origins Growth & Welfare Control variables  
M2 Fdgdp Bcbd Fcfd Dbacba Pcrb Pcrbof Eng. Frch. Por. GDPg GDPpcg Infl. Trade Gov. Pop.  
1.000 0.965 -0.235 -0.239 0.332 0.723 0.763 0.291 -0.375 0.138 0.005 0.097 -0.155 0.501 0.340 -0.493 M2 
 1.000 -0.288 -0.294 0.419 0.758 0.799 0.372 -0.414 0.074 0.042 0.136 -0.106 0.538 0.361 -0.510 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.961 0.089 0.210 0.171 -0.514 0.547 -0.060 -0.228 -0.254 -0.236 -0.310 -0.157 0.181 Bcbd 
   1.000 0.066 0.196 0.175 -0.512 0.554 -0.077 -0.198 -0.233 -0.219 -0.361 -0.182 0.219 Fcfd 
    1.000 0.522 0.515 0.036 0.022 -0.092 0.061 0.095 -0.306 0.329 0.188 -0.201 Dbacba 
     1.000 0.984 0.071 -0.085 0.023 -0.041 0.021 -0.186 0.269 0.129 -0.314 Pcrb 
      1.000 0.128 -0.130 0.005 -0.039 0.022 -0.177 0.283 0.167 -0.317 Pcrbof 
       1.000 -0.792 -0.309 0.122 0.144 0.251 0.385 0.338 -0.146 Eng. 
        1.000 -0.334 -0.171 -0.210 -0.294 -0.330 -0.260 0.257 Frch. 
         1.000 0.078 0.105 0.070 -0.095 -0.115 -0.174 Por. 
          1.000 0.981 0.036 0.020 -0.062 0.014 GDPg 
           1.000 0.007 0.112 -0.013 -0.169 GDPpcg 
            1.000 -0.078 -0.093 0.138 Infl. 
             1.000 0.411 -0.489 Trade 
              1.000 -0.266 Gov. 
               1.000 Pop. 
M2: Broad money supply.  Fdgdp: Financial deposit on GDP . Bcbd: Bank credit on bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial credit on financial deposits. Dbacba: deposit bank assets/ (deposit bank assets + 
central bank assets). Pcrb: Private domestic credit on GDP. Prcbof: Private credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions on GDP. Eng: English legal origin dummy. Frch: French legal 
origin dummy. Por: Portuguese legal origin dummy. GDPg: GDP growth rate. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. Infl:Inflation. Gov: Government final expenditure. Pop: Population growth rate.  
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